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Abstract
The conventional rational-expectations postulate rules out the pos-
sibility that agents will form systematically biased forecasts of eco-
nomic variables. I revisit this question under the assumption that
agentsexpectations are based on a misperceived causal model. Specif-
ically, I analyze a model in which an agent forms forecasts of economic
variables after observing a signal. His forecasts are based on tting a
subjective causal model - formalized as a direct acyclic graph, follow-
ing the Bayesian networks literature - to objective long-run data.
I show that the agents forecasts are never systematically biased if
and only if his graph is perfect - equivalently, if the direction of the
causal links he postulates has no empirical content. I demonstrate
the relevance of this result for economic applications - mainly a styl-
ized monetary policyexample in which the ination-output relation
obeys an expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
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1 Introduction
The outcome of many real-life interactions hinges on whether agents correctly
forecast particular variables. For instance, success of a police crackdown
on a drug-tra¢ cking operation hinges on its unpredictability. Likewise, the
immediate e¤ect of a wage cut on worker morale may depend on whether it
comes as a surprise. Finally, well-coordinated team production relies on one
units ability to anticipate how another unit will adapt to an observed shock.
In conventional models, an agents forecasts are constrained by the ratio-
nal expectationspostulate - i.e., the agent fully understands the statistical
regularities in his environment and thus forms optimal forecasts of any
economic variable conditional on his information. His predictions may miss
the target, but the errors will cancel out on average. In other words, the
agent cannot be systematically fooled.
Indeed, economists sometimes identify this property with the rational-
expectations principle itself. The following quote from an 2010 interview
with John Cochrane is representative:
What is rational expectations? It is the statement that you
[cannot] fool all the people all the time.1
However, rational expectations involve more than the requirement that agents
forecasts of individual variables are unbiased on average, because they de-
mand a correct perception of the entire joint distribution over all variables.
A priori, an agents beliefs may satisfy the former while violating the latter.
In this paper, I relax rational expectations and revisit the question of
whether agents can be systematically fooled. Of course, one can depart
from rational expectations in many directions. I focus on the role of causal
misperceptions in the formation of beliefs, and assume that the agent derives
his expectations by tting a misspecied causal model to objective long-run
data.
1See http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/interview-with-john-cochrane.
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Example 1.1: Exploiting a belief in monetary neutrality
Perhaps the most well-known manifestation of the question of whether eco-
nomic agents can be systematically fooled lies within monetary theory. In a
textbook model that goes back to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro
and Gordon (1983), a central bank controls a policy variable that a¤ects ina-
tion. The private sector forms an ination forecast, possibly after observing
some signal regarding the central banks decision. Private-sector expecta-
tions are relevant because real output (or unemployment) is determined by
an expectations-augmentedPhillips curve, such that the real e¤ect of in-
ation is at least partly o¤set when ination is anticipated. It follows that
monetary policy involves expectations management. To quote Woodford
(2003, p. 15):
. . . successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of e¤ec-
tive control of overnight interest rates as it is of shaping market
expectations of the way in which interest rates, ination and in-
come are likely to evolve. . . 
Thus, to the extent that the central bank wishes to maximize expected out-
put, it would like to set ination systematically above private-sector expec-
tations. And to the extent that the central bank wishes to minimize output
uctuations, it would like to avoid inationary surprises.
Although this paper is a purely theoretical exercise, it will make use of a
running example that is based on a simple reformulation of the Barro-Gordon
model studied by Sargent (2001), Athey et al. (2005) and others. The central
bank chooses an action a. Ination  is a stochastic function of a. The private
sector forms its ination forecast e after observing the central banks move.
Real output y is given by a New ClassicalPhillips curve, y =    e + ,
where  is independent Gaussian noise. Thus, only unanticipated ination
has real e¤ects. The central bank has a single motive: maximizing expected
output. If the private sector had rational expectations, e would be equal to
the true expected value of  conditional on a, and therefore ex-ante expected
output would be zero, independently of the central banks strategy.
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Now suppose that the private sector forms its expectations by reasoning in
terms of a causal model that links the relevant macro variables. The idea that
people reason about uncertainty via intuitive causal models has been studied
extensively by experimental psychologists (see Sloman (2005)). In the specic
context of macroeconomics, policy makers and private-sector actors often
believe in basic narratives about how macro variables are interconnected.
Such narratives are often causal - indeed, Hoover (2001) describes historical
controversies in macroeconomics in such terms. Furthermore, key nancial-
sector actors employ statistical models to form macroeconomic forecasts.
These models sometimes take the form of a recursive system of equations,
which is consistent with a causal model. While the functional forms of these
equations may be tweaked from time to time for the sake of empirical t,
their underlying causality assumptions are more likely to remain constant
during times of relative stability.2
To formalize the notion that agents rely on causal models to form expec-
tations, I employ a recent modeling framework (Spiegler (2015a)), which in
turn builds on the Statistics and Articial-Intelligence literature on Bayesian
networks (Cowell et al. (1999), Pearl (2009)). A causal model is represented
by a directed acyclic graph (DAG); each node represents a variable, and a
direct link between two nodes signies a perceived direct causal link between
the variables they represent.
Specically, suppose that the private sectors DAG, denoted R, is
a!   y (1)
This DAG represents a causal model according to which ination is a con-
sequence of two independent causes: output and the central banks action
(the model omits the private sectors expectations). The causal model is en-
tirely non-parametric: it postulates direct causal relations between variables
without assuming anything regarding their sign or magnitude.
The causal model R is misspecied because it perceives output to be
2For a study of how macroeconomic forecasters rely on models, see Giacomini et al.
(2015).
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independent of monetary policy, whereas according to the true process it
is a consequence of the central banks action via the Phillips curve. Thus,
the private sector subscribes to a classicalworldview that postulates the
absolute neutrality of monetary policy, whereas the true model allows for
non-neutrality via inationary surprises.
How does the private sector employ its causal model to forecast ination?
It simply ts the model to the true steady-state joint distribution p over
a; ; y. If p were consistent with R, p(a; ; y) could be written as
pR(a; ; y) = p(a)p(y)p( j a; y) (2)
The formula pR(a; ; y) describes the private sectors subjective belief as
a function of the true steady-state distribution p. It is an example of a
Bayesian-network factorization formula, which factorizes the steady-state
distribution p into a product of conditional-probability terms, as if p were
consistent with R. Because the private sector perceives statistical regulari-
ties through the prism of an incorrect causal model, the subjective belief pR
may systematically distort the true correlation structure of the steady-state
distribution p.
The private sectors ination forecast after observing the central banks
action a is
ER( j a) =
X

pR( j a) =
X

 X
y
p(y)p( j a; y)
!
 (3)
This is in general di¤erent from the rationalination forecast
Ep( j a) =
X

p( j a) =
X

 X
y
p(y j a)p( j a; y)
!

The discrepancy arises because pR( j a) involves an implicit expectation
over y without conditioning on a. Note that because the steady-state distri-
bution p is a¤ected by the private sectors expectations, it is essentially an
equilibriumdistribution; the equilibrium requirement is that the private
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sectors ination forecast e is ER( j a) as given by (3).
How does the private sectors non-rationalination forecast a¤ect the
central banks considerations? In Section 3, I present a natural specication
of the mapping from a to , for which the central bank can randomize over
a in a way that leads the private sector to systematically underestimate
ination - i.e., X
a
p(a)ER( j a) <
X

p()
Consequently, the central bank can use monetary policy to enhance expected
output.
Plan of the paper
In Section 2, I present a general model, in which an agent forms forecasts
of economic variables after observing the realization of one variable. The
agents subjective causal model is represented by a DAG over a set of nodes
that correspond to some subset of the economic variables. He ts this model
to a joint probability distribution over all variables, including possibly the
agents forecasts. The distribution satises an equilibriumcondition that
the agents forecasts are consistent with his causal model.
I ask the following question: Can such an agent be systematically fooled?
The main result, given in Section 4, provides a simple answer: The agents
forecasts are always correct on average if and only if his DAG is perfect.
A DAG is perfect if any pair of direct causes of a given variable must be
directly linked themselves. The private sectors DAG in Example 1.1 violates
perfection, because it perceives a and y as direct causes of , and yet it does
not postulate a direct causal link between the two. As a result, we could nd
some objective distribution for which the agents forecast of some variable is
biased on average. In contrast, the DAG a! y !  is perfect, and therefore
cannot give rise to systematically biased forecasts of ination or output.
Perfection is a familiar property in the Bayesian-networks literature. In
the present context, its signicance is that in perfect DAGs (and only in
such DAGs), the direction of any given causal link is unidentied (in the
sense that there exists a DAG that induces the same mapping from objective
distributions to subjective beliefs, for which this link is reversed). Thus, the
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agents misspecied causal model renders him vulnerable to biased forecasts
if and only if it postulates empirically meaningful direction of causation.
Furthermore, Spiegler (2015b) showed that when R is perfect, pR can
also be interpreted as the outcome of an attempt (by the agent himself or
by an analysthe relies on) to extrapolate a subjective belief from partial
statistical datasets drawn from p, via an intuitive procedure (an iterative
variant on a method known as conditional stochastic imputation. From
this point of view, perfect DAGs capture implicit data limitations rather than
an explicit causal model. The main result thus implies that the extrapolation
procedure is sound, in the sense that it does not expose the agent to
systematic forecast errors.
The perfection requirement can be weakened when we are interested in
forecasts of specific variables, or when we restrict the domain of permissible
exogenous processes. In particular, in Section 5 I show that in our monetary
policyexample, when  = a + " and " is independent Gaussian noise, the
agents ination forecasts are consistent with rational expectations for any
realization of the central banks action. In this case, the classical result
regarding the non-exploitability of the Phillips relation continues to hold.
Impossibility results of this kind are intriguing, considering the heated
historical debates over the exploitability of the ination-output relation (see
Klamer (1984)). The key assumption behind classical non-exploitability re-
sults (Lucas (1972), Sargent and Wallace (1975)) was allegedly the ratio-
nality of private-sector expectations. However, according to this paper, a
considerably milder assumption - namely that the private sector forms its
expectations by tting a (potentially misspecied) causal model to long-run
data - reproduces results in a similar vein.
So far, our discussion focused on whether the agents forecasts are correct
on average. In many contexts, however, conditional forecast errors matter
even if they cancel out. In Section 6 I characterize the DAGs for which the
agents conditional forecast errors are always correct - a far more demanding
characterization than perfection. I also present two examples that demon-
strate the implications of DAGs that lead to conditional forecast errors, even
though forecasts are systematically unbiased. First, I study a monopoly
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pricing example, in which demand for the monopolists intrinsically useless
product stems from consumersreverse causalitymisperception. Second, I
examine an elaborate version of the linear-normal specication of the mon-
etary policyexample, in which the central bank trades o¤ the variance of
real output and the mean square deviation of ination from an exogenously
distributed target. The central banks optimal policy displays excess rigidity
relative to the rational-expectations benchmark, which is exacerbated as the
Phillips relation becomes less noisy.
2 The Model
Let x0; x1; :::; xn be a collection of real-valued economic variables. An agent
observes the realization of x0 and forms a subjective forecast ei of each of the
economic variables xi, i = 1; :::; n. I use p to denote a joint distribution over
all 2n+ 1 variables. In all the applications in this paper, x0 is interpreted as
the action of a principal, possibly taken after having observed the realization
of other variables. Therefore, I will often refer to x0 as an action and denote
it by a.
If the agents forecast is based on rational expectations, then p must
satisfy the restriction that for every i = 1; :::; n, p(ei j a) assigns probability
one to
Ep(xi j a) =
X
xi
p(xi j a)xi
Other models of belief formation would imply other restrictions on p(ei j a).
Let us now introduce the idea that the agent forms his beliefs by tting
a subjective causal model to long-run data. This will require basic con-
cepts from the literature on Bayesian networks. The following exposition
is standard (see Cowell et al. (1999) and Pearl (2009)), with a few minor
adjustments. I will sometimes denote ei = xi+n (for every i = 1; :::; n) and
x = (x0; x1; :::; x2n). For every M  f0; 1; :::; 2ng, denote xM = (xi)i2M .
Dene a directed acyclic graph (DAG) (N;R), where N  f0; :::; ng is
the set of nodes and R is the set of directed links. (A directed graph is
acyclic if it does not contain a directed path from a node to itself.) I use jRi
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or j ! i interchangeably to denote a directed link from j into i. Observe
that the binary relation R is asymmetric and acyclic. Abusing notation, let
R(i) = fj 2 N j jRig be the set of parentsof node i. I will usually refer
to R itself as the DAG.
Let ~R be the skeleton (i.e., undirected version) of R - i.e., i ~Rj if and only
if iRj or jRi. A subset M  N is a clique in R if i ~Rj for every i; j 2M . A
clique M is ancestral if R(i) M for every i 2M . In particular, a node i is
ancestral if R(i) is empty. A node j is an ancestor of another node i in R if
R contains a directed path from j into i.
The agent is characterized by a DAG R. For any objective joint proba-
bility distribution p, the agents subjective belief over xN is
pR(xN) =
Y
i2N
p(xi j xR(i)) (4)
Thus, R encodes a mapping that transforms every objective distribution p
into a subjective belief pR. A probability distribution p is consistent with R
if pR(xN)  p(xN). When the DAG is fully connected, (4) is reduced to a
textbook chain rule, such that every p is consistent with R - i.e., the agent
has rational expectations. Note that in general, (4) may involve terms
that condition on zero-probability events; when analyzing the model, I will
need to rule out this possibility. The agents subjective distribution over any
variable xi, i = 1; :::; n, conditional on his observation of a is pR(xi j a) =
pR(a; xi)=pR(xi), where pR(xi) =
P
x i pR(xi; x i), as usual.
Following Pearl (2009), I interpret R as a causal model. The link j ! i
means that the agent regards the variable xj to be an immediate cause of the
variable xi. While the agent presupposes the existence of this causal link,
he has no preconception regarding its sign or magnitude. In particular, this
e¤ect could be measured to be null. In other words, R is a non-parametric
model. As a result, the agent is always able to perfectly t it to any objective
distribution. For a concrete image to match this description, think of an
analyst who tries to t data with a recursive system of equations. The
analyst holds the collection of R.H.S variables in each equation xed, but
tweaks the exact functional form, until he gets good t.
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From now on, I assume that 0 2 N . This motivation for this restric-
tion is that the agents causal model should acknowledge a variable that he
active conditions his forecast on. I also impose the following equilibrium
restriction on the objective distribution p.
Condition 1 The domain of permissible objective distributions is restricted
as follows. For every a and i = 1; :::; n, p(ei j a) assigns probability one to
ER(xi j a) =
X
xi
pR(xi j a)xi (5)
The conditional expected value ER(xi j a) is the agents forecast of xi
after observing a. If the agent could - or felt the need to - test his causal
model against long-run data, he would discover any discrepancy between
ER(xi j a) and E(xi j a), thus refuting the model. I assume that no such
test for model misspecicationoccurs. See Spiegler (2015a) for a detailed
justication for this assumption.
Should we admit forecasts as variables in the agents causal model?
By assumption, the agents DAG does not admit his own forecasts as vari-
ables. However, forecasts are themselves variables that can play a role in
the determination of economic outcomes (e.g., see the expectational Phillips
curve in Example 1.1). Therefore, in principle they could enter the agents
causal model. Recall the notation ei = xi+n for every i = 1; :::; n. Allow the
set of nodes N in the agents DAG to be a subset of f0; 1; :::; 2ng. Thus,
when i 2 N for some i > n, this means that the agents causal model admits
ei n as a variable. Recall our earlier restriction that 0 2 N . When as admit
forecasts as variables, the following is a sensible additional restriction.
Condition 2 If i 2 N for some i > n, then R(i) = f0g and i  n 2 N .
This condition makes two requirements. First, it says that the agent
perceives x0 to be the only immediate cause of his own forecasts. The jus-
tication is that the agent actively conditions his forecasts on x0 alone; his
causal model should acknowledge this. Second, it requires that if the agents
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DAG includes a forecast of some variable, then it must also include the vari-
able itself.
These two domain restrictions imply the following result.
Remark 1 Suppose that the domain of permissible objective distributions
satises Condition 1 and that R satises Condition 2 (as well as the re-
quirement that 0 2 N). Then, there is a DAG R0 that omits the nodes
n + 1; :::; 2n altogether, such that pR0(xN fn+1;:::;2ng)  pR(xN fn+1;:::;2ng) for
every p in the restricted domain. In particular, if jRi for some i 2 f1; :::; ng
and j 2 fn+ 1; :::; 2ng, then 0R0i.
Proof. Suppose that i + n 2 N for some i = 1; :::; n. Then, by Condition
2, the factorization formula (4) contains the term p(ei j a). Also, i 2 N .
By assumption, p(ER(xi j a) j a) = 1. Therefore, we can remove the term
p(ei j a) from (4) altogether, and plug ei = ER(xi j a) in any term in (4)
that conditions on ei - which e¤ectively means that such a term conditions
on a. We have thus obtained a DAG representation in which the node e is
omitted, and any link from e to some node in R is replaced with a link from
a into the same node.
This result means that our original assumption that the agents DAG
omits his own forecasts is w.l.o.g - as long as we accept the domain restrictions
on p and R. Therefore, I will continue to follow this practice from now on.
3 The Monetary PolicyExample
The general problem in this paper is: When will an agent with a misspecied
causal model form systematically biased economic forecasts? In applications,
this question will be relevant because it is implied by the principals objective
function. To illustrate the problem, let us return to Example 1.1. Recall
that in this example, there are three economic variables: the central banks
action a, ination  and real output y. The private sectors ination forecast
is denoted e. Both  and a take values in f0; 1g, where  = 0 (1) represents
low (high) ination. Assume that p satises p( = 1 j a) = a, where
11
 2 (0; 1). Thus, the action a = 0 induces low ination with certainty,
whereas the action a = 1 induces high ination with probability . Output
is given by y =    e+ , where   N(0; 2) is independently distributed.
Note that p is consistent with the following true DAGR:
a ! 
# #
e ! y
In contrast, the private sectors DAG R is a !   y. In relation to the
true DAG R, R reverses the causal link between ination and output, and
it neglects the e¤ect of inationary expectations on output. The private
sectors conditional ination forecast under R is (3).3
The central bank commits ex-ante to a probability distribution over a.
Its strategy is dened by p(a = 1) = . Assume that the central bank has a
sole objective: maximizing expected output. Plugging the Phillips curve, we
obtain the following objective function:X
a
p(a) [Ep( j a)  ER( j a)] = Ep() 
X
a
p(a)ER( j a)
If the central bank could not systematically fool the private sector, the value
of this objective function would be zero for any strategy that it might employ.
However, we will now see that the central bank can use a random strategy
to cause the private sector to systematically underestimate ination, thus
enhancing expected output.
Proposition 1 As 2 ! 0, the maximal expected output converges to 14.
The level is attained by playing  = 1
2
.
Proof. Denote ER( j a) = e(a). Because  2 f0; 1g,
e(a) =
X
y
p(y)p( = 1 j a; y)
3Throughout the paper, I use simple summations rather than integration when writing
down expressions for ER(xi j x0), for notational clarity.
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Because  is normally distributed, p(a; y) has full support, such that e(a)
never involves conditioning on zero-probability events.
Let us rst calculate e(0). Because p( = 1 j a = 0) = 0, it follows that
p( = 1 j a = 0; y) = 0 for all y. Therefore, e(0) = 0. This in turn means
that E(y j a = 0) = 0. It follows that if  = 0, the central bank cannot
induce strictly positive expected output. From now on, assume  > 0.
Let us now calculate e(1). First, note that y  N(; 2), where  is ran-
dom:  = e(0) = 0 with probability 1 ,  = 1  e(1) with probability ,
and  =  e(1) with probability (1  ). A priori, two of these three values
could coincide. However, we will now see that this is not the case. Because
the normal distribution is symmetrically distributed around its mean, the
ex-ante probability of y <  e(1) is at least (1  )=2, whereas the ex-ante
probability of y > 1   e(1) is at least =2. Moreover, as 2 tends to 0,
p( = 1 j a = 1; y <  e(1)) ! 0 and p( = 1 j a = 1; y > 1   e(1)) ! 1.
Therefore, in the 2 ! 0 limit,
0 <

2
 e(1)  1  (1  )
2
< 1
It follows that as 2 approaches zero,  gets exactly three values,  e(1),
0 and 1   e(1), and the gap between these values is bounded away from
zero. In the 2 ! 0 limit, p( = 1 j a = 1; y) ! 1 in the neighborhood of
y = 1  e(1), whereas p( = 1 j a = 1; y)! 0 in the neighborhoods of y = 0
and y =  e(1). Consequently, e(1)! p( = 1) =  as 2 ! 0.
We have thus established that E() =  and
P
a p(a)e(a) =    +
(1   )  0 = 2. The central bank will choose  to maximize    2,
which immediately gives the solution.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. When the realization of the
central banks strategy is a = 0, it induces  = 0 with certainty. Therefore,
the private sectors failure to properly account for variations in y does not
lead to a biased ination estimate: because p( = 0 j a = 0; y) = 1 for any y,
we have ER( j a = 0) = 0. In contrast, when a = 1, ination does uctuate,
and the private sectors error is that it tries to account for these uctuations
by uctuations in y, as if the latter are exogenous. Therefore, the private
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sectors ination forecast conditional on a = 1 involves summing over all
values of y, without conditioning y on a = 1. In the 2 ! 0 limit, this failure
to condition on a = 1 translates to the identityER( j a = 1) = ER(). Thus,
when the central bank plays a = 0, the private sector correctly updates its
belief downward, whereas when the central bank plays a = 1, the private
sector forms its ination forecast as if it did not observe the central banks
action. This leads to systematic underestimation of expected ination. Note
that  is irrelevant for the central banks strategy, due to the linearity of
ER( j a = 1) in .
4 General Analysis
In the previous section, we saw how a misspecied DAG may lead to a sys-
tematically biased forecast of some economic variable. However, other DAGs
always generate forecasts that are correct on average. A simple example is an
empty DAG (i.e., R(i) = ? for every i 2 N). It is easy to see from (4) that
in this case, pR(xi j a)  p(xi) and therefore
P
a p(a)ER(xi j a) = Ep(xi).
Denition 1 A DAG R induces unbiased forecasts ifX
a
p(a)ER(xi j a)  Ep(xi)
for every i 2 N and every objective distribution p that has full support on
XN and satises Condition 1.
The role of the full-support restriction is to prevent pR from including
terms that condition on zero-probability events. Condition 1 plays no tech-
nical role, and I introduce it only for the sake of maintaining the equilibrium
interpretation of p. Our problem is to characterize the DAGs that induce un-
biased forecasts. For this purpose, we need to introduce a few basic concepts
and results from the Bayesian-networks literature.
Equivalent DAGs
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A DAG encodes a mapping from objective distributions to subjective beliefs,
which is given by (4). Two DAGs can be equivalent in the sense that they
encode the same mapping.
Denition 2 Two DAGs R and Q over N are equivalent if pR(xN) 
pQ(xN) for every p 2 (X).
For instance, the DAGs 1 ! 2 and 2 ! 1 are equivalent, by the basic
identity p(x1)p(x2 j x1)  p(x2)p(x1 j x2). A DAG that involves intuitive
causal relations can be equivalent to a DAG that makes little sense as a causal
model (e.g., it postulates that a players action causes his information).
A v-collider in R is an ordered triple of nodes (i; j; k) such that iRk, jRk,
i /Rj and j /Ri (that is, R contains links from i and j into k, yet i and j are
not linked to each other). We say in this case that there is a v-collider into
k.
Proposition 2 (Verma and Pearl (1991)) Two DAGs R and Q are equiv-
alent if and only if they have the same skeleton and the same set of v-colliders.
To illustrate this result, all fully connected DAGs have the same skeleton
(every pair of nodes is linked) and an empty set of v-colliders, hence they
are all equivalent. In contrast, the DAGs 1 ! 2 ! 3 and 1 ! 2  3 are
not equivalent: although their skeletons are identical, the former DAG has
no v-colliders whereas (1; 3; 2) is a v-collider in the latter.
Perfect DAGs
The following class of DAGs will play an important role in this paper.
Denition 3 A DAG is perfect if it contains no v-colliders.
That is, a perfect DAG has the property that if iRk and jRk, then i ~Rj -
i.e., if xi and xj are perceived as direct causes of xk, then there must be
a perceived direct causal link between them. If we think of a DAG as a
recursive system of structural (non-parametric) equations, then perfection
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means that if xi and xj appear as explanatory variables in the equation for
xk, then there must be an equation in which one of these two variables is
explanatory and the other is dependent.
The following is an immediate implication of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Two perfect DAGs are equivalent if and only if they have the
same skeleton. In particular, if M  N is a clique in a perfect DAG R, then
M is an ancestral clique in some DAG in the equivalence class of R.
This corollary means that the causal links postulated by a perfect DAG are
unidentied: if iRj, there exists a DAG R0 that is equivalent to R, such that
jR0i. A DAG contains empirically meaningful causal links only when they
are part of a v-collider.
The following lemma establishes that if C is an ancestral clique in some
DAG in the equivalence class of R, then the objective and subjective marginal
distributions over xC always coincide. Otherwise, we can nd a distribution
for which the two will diverge.
Lemma 1 (Spiegler (2015b)) Let R be a DAG and let C  N . Then,
pR(xC)  p(xC) for every p with full support on XN if and only if C is an
ancestral clique in some DAG in the equivalence class of R.
Thanks to Corollary 1, the lemma implies that in a perfect DAG, pR(xC) is
always correct for any clique C.
We are now ready to state the papers main result.
Proposition 3 A DAG R induces unbiased forecasts if and only if it is per-
fect.
Proof. (If). Assume that R is perfect. Then, by Corollary 1, we can take 0
or i to be ancestral w.l.o.g. By Lemma 1, pR(x0)  p(x0) and pR(xi)  p(xi).
Therefore, we can writeX
x0
p(x0)pR(xi j x0) 
X
x0
pR(x0)pR(xi j x0)  pR(xi)  p(xi)
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which implies the claim.
(Only if). Consider the special case in which Xi = f0; 1g for every i,
such that the expected value of any xi w.r.t any distribution is equal to
the probability that xi = 1. I will comment at the end of the proof on how it
can be extended to arbitrarily large X. When R is imperfect, it must contain
a v-collider i ! j  k. Let us consider objective distributions p with full
support on XN , for which all other variables are independent, such that
pR(xN) = p(xi)p(xk)p(xj j xi; xk) 
Y
i02N fi;j;kg
p(xi0)
This allows us to ignore all variables i0 2 N   fi; j; kg when calculating
marginal or conditional distributions over xj that are derived from pR.
There are three cases to consider. First, suppose that 0 =2 fi; j; kg - i.e.,
0 is not part of the v-collider. Then, pR(xj j x0)  pR(xj). By Proposition
2, j is not an ancestral node in any DAG in the equivalence class of R.
Therefore, by Lemma 1, we can nd p for which pR 6= p. (Our restrictions on
p are w.l.o.g in this regard, because we can ignore all nodes i0 6= i; j; k and
set R : i! j  k.)
Second, suppose that i = 0. Then,
pR(xj = 1 j x0) =
X
xk
p(xk)p(xj = 1 j x0; xk)
Impose the following additional structure on p. First, p(x0 = 1) = 12 . Second,
xk = xj = x0 with arbitrarily high probability. Third, p(xj = 1 j x0 6= xk) is
arbitrarily low. Then,X
x0
p(x0)pR(xj = 1 j x0) =
1
2
(X
xk
p(xk) [p(xj = 1 j x0 = 0;xk) + p(xj = 1 j x0 = 1;xk)]
)
is arbitrarily close to 1
4
, whereas p(xj = 1) = 12 .
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Finally, suppose that j = 0. Then,
pR(xi = 1 j x0) =
P
xk
p(xk)p(xi = 1)p(x0 j xi = 1;xk)P
xk
p(xk)
P
xi
p(xi)p(x0 j xi;xk)
Impose the following additional structure on p. First, p(xk = 1) = 12 . Second,
p(xi = xk) with arbitrarily high probability. Third, p(x0 = 1 j xi; xk) is
arbitrarily high when xixk = 1 and arbitrarily low when xixk = 0. Then,
pR(xi = 1 j x0 = 1) is arbitrarily close to 1, and pR(xi = 1 j x0 = 0) is
arbitrarily close to 1
3
, such that
P
x0
p(x0)pR(xi = 1 j x0) is arbitrarily close
to 2
3
, whereas p(xi = 1) = 12 .
Extending the proof to arbitrarily large X is straightforward - we only
need to assume that the marginal of p over each of the variables xi; xj; xk
assigns arbitrarily high total probability to two arbitrary values, and that the
small probability that is assigned to each of the other values is independently
distributed.
Thus, as long as the agents DAG is perfect, he cannot be systematically
fooled. Even if his conditional forecasts are incorrect, the errors cancel out
on average. For instance, in our running monetary policyexample, if the
private sectors DAG were a! y !  or   a! y, its output and ination
forecasts would be unbiased on average, even though the causal models these
DAGs represent are misspecied. Conversely, if the agents DAG is imperfect,
there are objective distributions for which the agents average forecast of at
least one of the economic variables is biased.
As mentioned earlier in this section, perfect DAGs have the property that
the causal links they postulate are unidentied, and in this sense completely
spurious. Thus, the signicance of Proposition 3 is that it demonstrates that
the agents misspecied causal model exposes him to systematic fooling if
and only if the causal assumptions he makes are non-trivial.
Selective forecasts
The denition of unbiased forecasts that I utilized in this section is very
demanding, because it requires the forecast of all variables to be unbiased.
However, not all forecasts need to be economically relevant. For example,
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in the monetary policy example of Section 3, I assumed that the true
process follows Sargent (2001). In particular, this meant that while the pri-
vate sectors ination forecast has implications for the realization of economic
variables, its output forecast was irrelevant. In other conventional models of
monetary policy - specically, the so-called New Keynesian model - both
ination and output forecasts matter for the realization of macroeconomic
variables (see Woodford (2003)). Thus, the forecasts that matter economi-
cally depend on the true model that underlies the objective distribution.
The following result is a su¢ cient condition for the agents forecast of
a given xi to be unbiased. Fix a DAG (N;R) and consider a node i 2 N .
Dene a binary relation P as follows. For every distinct i; j 2 N , iP j if
at least one of the following conditions hold in R: (i) i is an ancestor of j;
(ii) i and j have a common ancestor and j is not an ancestor of i. Denote
LR(i) = fj 2 N j iP jg. Observe that i =2 LR(i).
Proposition 4 Let i 2 N   f0g. Suppose further that the subgraph induced
by R over N   LR(i) is perfect and contains 0. Then,X
x0
p(x0)ER(xi j x0) = Ep(x0)
Proof. It is immediate from the factorization formula (4) that if iP j, then
xj is irrelevant for the calculation of pR(xN LR(i)). Therefore, we can ignore
all such variables. By assumption, the subgraph over N   LR(i) induced by
R is perfect. Because 0; i 2 N   LR(i), Proposition 3 implies the result.
Thus, as long as the violations of perfection occur below0 and i in the
causal hierarchy, they do not cause biased forecasts of xi.
5 Linear-Normal Models
Proposition 3 means that an imperfect DAG exposes the agent to being
systematically fooled for some objective distribution. However, in applica-
tions we typically impose additional structure that restricts the domain of
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permissible objective distributions. Such domain restrictions extend the im-
possibility of systematically fooling an agent with causal misperceptions. In
this section I focus on a common domain restriction, which assumes that
variables are linked by a system of linear equations with Gaussian noise.
Example 5.1: A linear-normal monetary policyexample
Modify the example of Section 3 by assuming that  and y are given by the
following equations:
 = a+ " (6)
y =    e+ 
where   1 is a constant, and "  N(0; 2") and   N(0; 2") are indepen-
dent. This example changes the mapping from a to , and also introduces
the new parameter . When  > 1, fully anticipated ination has real e¤ects.
Throughout this example, I use z to denote the true expected value of any
variable z.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the private sectors DAG is R : a !   y.
Then, the private sectors forecasts are unbiased for every objective distribu-
tion that satises (6).
Proof. Because y is an ancestral node in R, Proposition 4 implies that
the private sectors output forecast is unbiased. Let us turn to the private
sectors ination forecast. As in Section 3, I use e(a) to denote the forecast
after observing the realization a. By the denition of R,
e(a) =
X

pR( j a) =
X

X
y
p(y)p( j a; y) =
X
y
p(y)E( j a; y)
Since  = a+ ", E( j a; y) = a+E(" j a; y). By the second equation in (6),
we have
"+  = y   a+ e(a)
For given a and y, the R.H.S is a constant, whereas the L.H.S is a sum of
two independent variables that are normally distributed with mean zero (and
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recall that the variance of " is 22"). Therefore, to calculate E(" j a; y),
we can apply the standard formula for E(X j X + Y ) when X and Y are
independent normal variables, and obtain
E(" j a; y) = 

(y   a+ e(a))
where
 =
22"
22" + 
2

(7)
We can now write
e(a) =
X
y
p(y)

a+


y   a+ 

e(a)

= a(1  ) + 

e(a) +


y
Since  = a + " and E(") = 0,  = a. Plugging the Phillips curve, we
obtain
e(a) = (1  )a+ 

e(a) +


[a   E(e(a))]
This functional equation denes e(a). Taking expectations, we obtain
E(e(a)) = (1  )a +


E(e(a)) + a  


E(e(a))
such that
E(e(a)) =
X
a
p(a)e(a) = a = 
This completes the proof. Nevertheless, it also enables us to get the
following explicit solution for e(a):
e(a) =
   
    a+
   
    a
Plugging the expression for , we obtain
e(a) =
2
(   1)2" + 2
a+
(   1)2"
(   1)2" + 2
a (8)
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This expression will be useful in Section 6.2.
Equation (8) implies that when  = 1, e(a)  a  Ep( j a). Thus,
under the linear-normal specication with  = 1, the private sector always
makes optimal conditional ination forecasts - as if it has rational expecta-
tions. When  > 1, its conditional forecasts are incorrect because they assign
positive weight to the ex-ante expected action. Nevertheless, the forecasts
are correct on average.
Example 5.1 suggests that linear-normal specications may give rise to
unbiased forecasts, even when the agents subjective DAG is imperfect. Let
us now elaborate on this observation. Return to the general environment
with n + 1 variables x0; x1; :::; xn. Suppose that p is consistent with some
true DAG R. Moreover, for every i = 0; 1; :::; n,
xi =
X
j2R(i)
ijxj + "i
where ij 6= 0, and "i  N(i; 2i ) is independently distributed. Thus, p
is given by a recursive system of linear equations with independent normal
error terms. We will say in this case that p is consistent with a linear-normal
model. Note that this is not a generalization of Example 5.1, because the
latter did not require the central banks random strategy to be normally
distributed.
Proposition 6 Suppose that 0 is an ancestral node in some DAG in the
equivalence class of R. Then, for every i = 1; :::; n,X
x0
p(x0)ER(xi j x0) = Ep(xi)
for every p that is consistent with a linear-normal model.
Proof. When p is consistent with a linear-normal model, we can rewrite the
system of equations such that for every i,
xi =
X
j2R(i)
ij"j
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where R is an extension of R into a linear ordering (i.e., jRi whenever
R contains a directed path from j into i), and ij is some constant. Thus,
every xi can be expressed as a sum of independent normal variables.
From now on, I will assume that i = 0 for every i. To see why this is
w.l.o.g, note that this assumption means that
yi = xi + ci
for every i, where ci is a constant that involves  and  coe¢ cients. It is
therefore clear that ER(yi j y0)  ER(xi j x0) + ci and Ep(yi)  Ep(xi) + ci,
such that we can restate our result for yi instead of xi. This simplication
means that Ep(xi) = 0 for every i = 0; :::; n.
By assumption, we can regard 0 as an ancestral node in R. Also, it will
simplify exposition if we align R with the natural order over 0; :::; n, such
that jRi implies j < i. Therefore, we can write
pR(xi j x0) =
Y
j=1;:::;i
p(xj j xR(j))
such that
ER(xi j x0) =
X
x1
  
X
xi 1
 
i 1Y
k=1
p(xk j xR(k))
!X
xi
p(xi j xR(i))xi
The vector of random variables xR(i) can be expressed as a product of some
matrix and the vector ("0; :::; "n). Because all the "is are independent normal
variables, xR(i) is jointly normal. Therefore, the expressionX
xi
p(xi j xR(i))xi = E(xi j xR(i))
is the expectation of a zero-mean normal variable conditional on the realiza-
tion of a zero-mean multi-variate normal distribution. Hence,
E(xi j xR(i)) =
X
j2R(i)
ijxj
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where ij is some constant. We have thus reduced ER(xi j x0) to
X
j2R(i)ij
X
x1
  
X
xi 1
 
i 1Y
k=1
p(xk j xR(k))
!
xj
Consider the term that corresponds to some j 2 R(i). We can ignore the
summation over all variables k > j, such that the term is reduced to
X
x1
  
X
xj 1
 
j 1Y
k=1
p(xk j xR(k))
!X
xj
p(xj j xR(j))xj
We can now repeatedly carry out this simplication in the same manner for
each of these terms, until we eventually obtain
E(xi j x0) = bx0
where b is some constant (potentially zero). Because E(x0) = 0, it then
immediately follows thatX
x0
p(x0)ER(xi j x0) = 0 = Ep(xi)
which completes the proof.
The condition that 0 is an ancestral node in some DAG in the equivalence
class ofR is signicantly weaker than perfection (recall that in a perfect DAG,
every node can be regarded as ancestral). The subjective DAG in Section
3 satises this weaker property. Under this restriction, the agents forecasts
are unbiased when the objective distribution is generated by a linear-normal
model.
6 Conditional Forecast Errors
So far, the question we addressed was whether the agents forecasts of eco-
nomic variables are unbiased on average. Indeed, in our running monetary
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policy example, this is all that mattered because the central banks sole
objective was to maximize expected output. However, for many purposes,
it also matters whether the agents conditional forecasts are consistent with
rational expectations for all realizations of a. The following is a su¢ cient
condition for this stronger requirement to hold for a given variable.
Suppose that R satises the su¢ cient condition of Proposition 4. If, in
addition, 0Ri, then ER(xi j x0)  Ep(xi j x0). The reason is as follows. By
assumption, the subgraph over N  LR(i) is perfect and contains both 0 and
i. Because f0; ig is a clique in the subgraph, perfection implies that we can
regard it as ancestral. Therefore, pR(x0; xi) - and consequently pR(x0) as well
- are all unbiased, which immediately implies the result.
In the remainder of this section, I present two principal-agent examples in
which the agents misspecied causal model generates conditional forecasts
errors, and I analyze the implications of these errors for the principals choice
of strategy.
6.1 Monopoly Pricing
This sub-section is a variation on the Dieters Dilemmaexample of Spiegler
(2015a). A monopolistic rm facing one consumer produces a food supple-
ment at a constant marginal cost k > 0. The rms action a takes values
in f0; 1g, where a = 1 means that the rm sells the supplement. There are
two other relevant variables: the consumers health (denoted h), and the
level of some chemical in his blood (denoted c). Both c and h take values in
f0; 1g, where h = 1 means that the consumer is in good health, and c = 1
means that the chemicals level is abnormal. According to the true process,
p(h = 1) = 1
2
, independently of a, and c is a deterministic consequence of a
and h given by c = (1  a)(1  h). The true process is thus consistent with
a true DAGa! c h.
The assumption that h is independent of a implies that if consumers had
rational expectations, their willingness to pay for the supplement would be
zero. Now suppose that the consumers DAG is R : a ! c ! h. This DAG
reverses the direction of causation between h and c relative to the true DAG.
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Because the consumers DAG is perfect, it leads to health forecasts that
are unbiased on average. However, as we shall see, the conditional health
forecasts are typically incorrect.
Because the rm has monopoly power, it fully extracts the consumers
willingness to pay for the supplement, which is pR(h = 1 j a = 1)   pR(h =
1 j a = 0). The rm commits to a mixture over actions, which is interpreted
as the long-run frequency with which it sells the supplement. Its objective is
to maximize the total prot
p(a = 1)  [pR(h = 1 j a = 1)  pR(h = 1 j a = 0)  k]
Denote p(a = 1) = . Spiegler (2015a) shows that
pR(h = 1 j a) = 1
(1 + )(2  a)
for every a = 0; 1, such that the consumers willingness to pay for the sup-
plement is 1=2(1 + ) - note that it decreasing in the selling frequency. The
rms problem is thus reduced to choosing  to maximize
 

1
2(1 + )
  k

It follows that when k  1
2
, the rm is unable to prot from the consumers
causal misperception. For k < 1
2
, the optimal solution is given by
 = min
(
1;
r
1
2k
  1
)
such that the consumers willingness to pay for the supplement is 1
4
for k  1
8
,
and
p
2k(1 p2k)=2 for k 2 (1
8
; 1
2
).
At rst glance, the comparative statics w.r.t k depicts a conventional
response to changes in marginal cost: as k goes down, the rm sells a greater
total quantity at a lower price. Normally, we would interpret this response
as sliding down a downward sloping demand curve. However, the logic is
di¤erent here. A decrease in k increases the rms incentive to produce; a
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larger selling frequency leads to a lower endogenous willingness to pay for
the supplement, and therefore the rm needs to lower the price.
6.2 Rigid Monetary Policy
For the last time in this paper, let us revisit the monetary policy, adopting
the linear-normal specication of Example 5.1. Unlike previous examples,
here the central bank does not wish to exploit the private sectors conditional
ination-forecast errors. Rather, these errors are an impediment to achieving
the central banks objectives, and they constrain its ability to adapt monetary
policy to changing circumstances.
Extend the basic example by adding an exogenous variable , which the
central bank privately observes  before taking its action. This variable
represents the ination target that the central bank would like to implement.
The other two economic variables,  and y, are independent of  conditional
on a. In particular, they obey the linear-normal equations (6). No structure
is imposed on the distribution of . The true process is consistent with the
true DAG
 ! a ! 
# #
e ! y
(9)
Let z denote the true expected value of any variable z.
The central banks objective is to minimize
V ar(y) + k  E(   )2 (10)
where k > 0 is a constant that captures the central banks trade-o¤ between
two motives: minimizing output variance and minimizing the mean square
deviation of ination from the target.
As a benchmark, suppose that the private sector has rational expecta-
tions. Then, its ination forecast conditional on a is Ep( j a) = a. There-
fore,
y = (   1)a+ "+ 
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Since " and  are independent variables with mean zero, we can ignore them
in the calculation of the objective function, which is reduced to
(   1)2E(a  a)2 + k  E(a  )2
Solving this problem is standard. The strategy that minimizes this objective
function is
a() =
k
(   1)2 + k +
(   1)2
(   1)2 + k
for every . This solution does not rely on the normality of " and .
The optimal policy under rational expectations exhibits some rigidity:
it is a weighted average of the realized ination target  and the ex-ante
average target . A higher weight on the former corresponds to a policy
that is more responsive to uctuations in the target. As  approaches 1 -
such that anticipated ination matters less for output - the central banks
policy approaches perfect targeting.
The private sectors DAG is
R :  ! a!   y
Thus, the private sectors causal model agrees with the true model about the
way  and a are jointly distributed; the only disagreement is about the way
output and ination are determined, along the same lines as in Section 3.
Proposition 7 Given the private sectors DAG R, the central banks optimal
policy is
a() =
k
(   1)2 + k +
(   1)2
(   1)2 + k
where
 =

22" + 
2

(   1)2" + 2
2
Proof. The central banks problem is to choose a strategy (i.e., a potentially
stochastic mapping from  to a) that minimizes (10) subject to the constraints
that  = a+" and y =  e(a)+. (Recall the notation e(a) = ER( j a).)
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In Section 5, we saw that e(a) is given by (8). Because the true process in
the current example has the feature that ; y ?  j a, the same expression
for e(a) continues to hold. Therefore,
E(y j a) = (   )a  (1  )a
where
 =
2
(   1)2" + 2
Thus, y = (   1)a.
Because " and  are independent variables with mean zero, we can ignore
them in the calculation of the objective function, which is reduced to
(   )2E(a  a)2 + kE(a  )2 (11)
This is exactly the same as in the rational-expectations case, except that
the coe¢ cient (   )2 replaces (   1)2. The policy that minimizes this
expression is a(), as given in the statement of the proposition. Again, the
derivation is standard and therefore omitted.
This result has a few noteworthy features. First, as observed in Section
5, the expression for e(a) given by (8) implies that when  = 1, the private
sectors ination forecasts are consistent with rational expectations, hence
the optimal policy fully tracks . Deviations from the rational-expectations
prediction occur when  > 1. In this case, the private sectors ination
forecast is a weighted average of a and its ex-ante expected value a. That is,
private-sector forecasts are not fully responsive to the central banks action.
The intuition is the same as in Section 3: the private sector erroneously
regards y as an exogenous variable that a¤ects , and therefore assigns some
weight to the ex-ante expected value of y when forming its ination forecast.
Because y is in fact a consequence of a, the private sector ends up assigning
weight to a, thus failing to fully condition on the actual realization of a.
The extent of this failure depends on the relative magnitudes of 2" and
2. As the Phillips relation becomes more reliable (relative to the reliability
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of the e¤ect of monetary policy on ination), the erroneous weight on a
increases and the deviation from rational expectations is exacerbated.
The private sectors expectational rigidityimpels the central bank to-
ward a more rigid policy than in the rational-expectations benchmark. This
can be immediately seen from the e¤ective objective function (11). Since
  1 by denition, the central bank places a larger weight on the considera-
tion of minimizing the variance of a, compared with the rational-expectations
benchmark. Excess rigidity of the optimal policy increases with 2"=
2
.
7 Discussion
In this section I briey discuss a few variations and extensions of the model,
as well as the papers relation to some works on non-rational expectations.
7.1 Ex-ante Forecasts
Throughout this paper, I assumed that the agent forms forecasts after ob-
serving a signal. A natural variant would assume that the agent forms his
forecasts without observing anything. In this case, the question becomes
whether the agents marginal subjective distribution over any given economic
variable (including the unobserved action) is unbiased on average.
Formally, we will say that a DAG R induces unbiased ex-ante forecasts if
ER(xi)  Ep(xi). The following result is a simple corollary of Proposition 2
in Spiegler (2015b): R induces unbiased ex-ante forecasts if and only if it is
perfect. Thus, perfection turns out to characterize the property of unbiased
forecasts, whether or not the agent conditions his forecast on a signal.
7.2 The Principals Commitment Problem
In all the versions of the monetary policyexample that appeared in this
paper, we looked for the central banks ex-ante optimal strategy. This im-
plicitly assumed that the central bank is able to commit ex-ante to a random
policy. Of course, the original Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon models
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were developed to highlight the role of commitment when the private sector
has rational expectations. However, note that I assumed that the private
sector observes the central banks actions. If the private sector had rational
expectations, there would be no role for ex-ante commitment, because the
central bank would never be tempted to deviate from the ex-ante optimal
action: the private sector would be able to monitor any deviation from the
pre-committed action and adapt its rational forecasts accordingly.
In contrast, when the private sector has a misspecied causal model, a
commitment problem does arise despite the perfect monitoring of the central
banks actions. Suppose that R : a ! y  . By our analysis in Section 4,
the private sectors ination forecast is correct on average. Yet, at the same
time it is entirely unresponsive to the realization of a. In other words, the
private sector forms its ination forecast as if it has rational expectations
but cannot monitor the central banks action - exactly as in the original
Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon models! To conclude, principal-agent
situations are vulnerable to a time-consistency problem when the agent has
causal misperceptions, even if he perfectly monitors the principals move.
7.3 Relevance to Dynamic Models
The model of this paper does not make any explicit assumptions regarding
the temporal realization of economic variables. Yet all the applications we
have seen were static. Nevertheless, the formalism can be applied to dynamic
models. Consider a discrete-time environment with an innite horizon. There
is a collection of exogenous variables,  = (1; :::; m), and a collection of
endogenous variables y = (y1; :::; yr). Let 
t and yt denote the realizations of
 and y at period t.
Imagine that the agent believes that the exogenous variables  evolve
according to some stochastic process with bounded memory, such that the
realization of t is a stochastic function of t 1; :::; t K , where K is con-
stant. In addition, the agent postulates that the endogenous variables evolve
according to a Markov equilibrium, such that yt is a stochastic function of
(t K ; :::; t). These assumptions imply a belief that exogenous and endoge-
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nous variables jointly evolve according to a Markov process, whose invariant
distribution plays the role of the objective distribution p in our model. The
DAG R - dened over nodes that correspond to current and lagged variables
- represents structural assumptions regarding this Markov process.
7.4 Related Literature
This paper contributes to a literature (reviewed in Spiegler (2015a)) that
studies strategic interaction among agents who base their decisions on mis-
specied subjective models. Within this literature, Piccione and Rubinstein
(2003) share the expectations managementaspect of the examples in the
present paper. In their model, the principal is a seller who commits to a de-
terministic temporal sequence of prices, taking into account that consumers
can only perceive statistical patterns that allow the price at any period t to
be a function of price realizations at periods t   1; :::; t   k, where k is a
constant that characterizes the consumer. When the value of k is negatively
correlated with consumerswillingness to pay, the seller may want to gen-
erate a complex price sequence as a price-discrimination device. Relatedly,
Ettinger and Jehiel (2010) study a bargaining model, in which a sophisti-
cated seller employs deception tactics that lead a buyer who exhibits coarse
reasoning to have a biased estimate of the objects value.
The paper is also related to a few works that examine monetary policy
when the rational-expectations assumption is relaxed. Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001) andWoodford (2013) review dynamic models in which agents form
non-rational expectations, and explore implications for monetary policy. See
Garcia-Schmidt and Woodford (2015) for a recent exercise in this tradition.
Sargent (2001), Cho et al. (2002) and Esponda and Pouzo (2015) study
models in which it is the central bank who forms non-rational expectations,
whereas the private sector is modeled conventionally.
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